UIC Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 1

Article 5

2017

Legal Solutions to a Political Party National Committee
Undermining U.S. Democracy, 51 J. Marshall L. Rev. 107 (2017)
John Baglia

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Election Law Commons, and the National Security Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John Baglia, Legal Solutions to a Political Party National Committee Undermining U.S. Democracy, 51 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 107 (2017)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol51/iss1/5
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO A POLITICAL
PARTY NATIONAL COMMITTEE
UNDERMINING U.S. DEMOCRACY
JOHN BAGLIA
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 107
BACKGROUND .................................................................. 110
A. The Evolution of Political Parties and Their
Rights ....................................................................... 110
B. A Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duties ............... 113
C. The Importance of a Citizen’s Right to Vote .......... 115
D. Wilding v. DNC Services Corp…. ........................... 118
III. ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 119
A. Party Committee Members Parallel Corporate
Directors................................................................... 119
1. Duty of Loyalty.................................................. 121
2. Duty of Care ...................................................... 123
B. Comparing Vote Dilution to When a Party Committee
Undermines Votes ................................................... 124
1. Malapportionment ............................................ 125
2. Gerrymandering and At-large Elections ......... 126
C. Issues in Wilding ..................................................... 128
IV. PROPOSAL ........................................................................ 129
A. The Fiduciary Duties of a Committee Member ..... 129
B. A Reformulated Vote Dilution Claim ..................... 131
C. The Above Proposals’ Advantages Over Wilding... 133
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................... 133

I. INTRODUCTION
“This is a silly story. He isn’t going to be president.”1 Taken out
of context, this statement made by Debbie Wasserman Schultz
(Wasserman Schultz), former National Chairperson of the
Democratic Party, seems to be an ordinary political opinion in
reference to Senator Bernie Sanders (Senator Sanders). However,
this statement coupled with thousands of emails2 between
Democratic National Committee (DNC) members during the 2016
Democratic Presidential Primary is more symbolic than everyday
political banter.
The Charter of the Democratic Party of the United States
prohibits members of the DNC from endorsing an individual
candidate during the party’s presidential nominating process.3
1. Leaked E-mail, DNC Email Database, WIKILEAKS (July 27, 2016),
wikileaks.org/dnc-emails/emailid/9999%20. The authenticity of the leaked
emails and documents has yet to be confirmed or denied by the DNC.
2. See Search the DNC email database, WIKILEAKS, wikileaks.org/dncemails/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (providing a total of 19,252 emails and 8,034
attachments available to search).
3. The Charter & The Bylaws of the Democratic Party of the United States,
art. V, § 4 (amended 2015), s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.democrats.org/Downloa
107
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Specifically, it states:
In the conduct and management of the affairs and procedures of the
Democratic National Committee, particularly as they apply to the
preparation and conduct of the Presidential nomination process, the
Chairpersons shall exercise impartiality and evenhandedness as
between the Presidential candidates and campaigns. The
Chairperson shall be responsible for ensuring that the national
officers and staff of the Democratic National Committee maintain
impartiality and evenhandedness during the Democratic Party
Presidential nominating process.4

Many of the emails that were made public indicate the DNC’s
violation of this section within the Charter by taking steps to
undermine Senator Sanders’ campaign. The emails reveal the
DNC’s goal of advancing the Senator’s opponent, former Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton, to the general election.5 This all came to
light a little over two months after Wasserman Schultz herself
stated that “the DNC remains neutral” with respect to the
democratic primary race.6
As a result of the public’s backlash, in response to the content
of the emails7, Wasserman Schultz and three other high ranking
officials8 of the DNC resigned.9 Additionally, at the start of the
ds/DNC_Charter__Bylaws_9.17.15.pdf [hereinafter The Charter of the
Democratic Party].
4. Id.
5. See Alana Abramson, The 4 Most Damaging Emails From the DNC
Wikileaks Dump, ABC NEWS (July 25, 2016, 11:13 AM), abcnews.go.com/Politic
s/damaging-dnc-wikileaks-dump/story?id=40852448 (discussing (1) a proposal
by the DNC CFO encouraging the DNC media contacts to undermine the
Sanders’s campaign and emphasize Sanders as “an atheist;” and (2) DNC
National Secretary suggesting to DNC National Communications Director that
the DNC build a narrative “that [Sanders] never had his act together, that his
campaign was a mess”).
6. DNC Remains Neutral in this Primary, (CNN television broadcast May
17, 2016), www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJdA-rvy3tM, at 0:35. Moreover,
Wasserman Schultz, in a statement quoted by the Associated Press stated, “I
remain, as I have been from the beginning, neutral in the presidential
Democratic primary.” Tribune news services, Sanders says he is backing
opponent of DNC chair Wasserman Schultz, CHI. TRIB. (May 21, 2016), www.ch
icagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-sanders-dnc-chair-20160521-sto
ry.html.
7. See B. Christopher Agee, Bernie Sanders Supporters Stage DNC Walkout
After Clinton Nomination, WESTERN JOURNALISM (July 26, 2016 5:54 PM), ww
w.westernjournalism.com/bernie-sanders-supporters-stage-dnc-walkout-afterclinton-nomination/ (reporting more than 100 attendees at the convention
organized a walkout).
8. See Heads roll at DNC: 3 top officials out after email hack, FOX NEWS
(Aug. 2, 2016), www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/08/02/sources-ceo-at-democratic
-national-committee-resigns.html (stating Chief Executive Officer Amy Dacey,
Chief Financial Officer Brad Marshall, and Communications Director Luis
Miranda left their jobs).
9. Alan Rappeport, Debbie Wasserman Schultz to Resign DNC Post, N.Y.
TIMES (July 24, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/us/politics/debbie-wasser
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Democratic National Convention, the DNC issued an apology to
Senator Sanders and his supporters.10 Is this response sufficient to
promote political parties’ accountability and deter similar behavior
in the future by those who play such integral roles in preserving the
integrity of political elections? Did the DNC infringe on voters’
rights? Or is the DNC legally permitted to behave in this manner?
This begs the question which is at the center of this Comment: Can
the law provide a remedy when the actions of a political party’s
national committee undermine the integrity of an election or is it
best handled within the political arena?
Part II of this Comment will begin with a discussion on the
history and development of rights afforded to political parties. It
will then provide an overview of the fiduciary duties owed to the
corporation’s shareholders by the corporation’s directors. This
overview is necessary to understand the analogies presented in
section III.A. Part II will then provide a brief discussion on the
importance of the right to vote and examples of that right being
affected in the past to set up the analogies set forth in section III.B.
Lastly, part II will introduce and discuss a recently dismissed class
action lawsuit against the DNC and Wasserman Schultz,
specifically, the allegations brought against the defendants, their
responses, and the court’s position on the matter.
Part III will discuss and analogize the roles and
responsibilities of party committee members to those of corporate
directors. Highlighting these similarities adds weight to this
Comment’s first proposal, introduced in section IV.A. It will then
compare the effects of a party undermining certain votes, by
exemplifying the DNC’s email leak, with the effects of vote dilution
practices introduced therein. These comparisons provide guidance
for the second proposal introduced in section IV. Part III will
conclude by highlighting the flaws of the class action lawsuit that
was dismissed against the DNC and Wasserman Schultz.
Depending on whether courts view political parties as private
associations or quasi-governmental actors, part IV proposes two
alternative solutions for when committee members undermine the
integrity of an election. First, due to the similarities between
corporate directors and party committee members, section IV.A will
man-schultz-dnc-wikileaks-emails.html?_r=0; Luciana Lopez & Amanda
Becker, Senior Democratic National Committee Officials Resign: DNC,
REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2016, 3:32 PM), www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-democ
rats-idUSKCN10D209.
10. See Will Drabold, DNC Apologizes to Bernie Sanders and Supporters
Over Leaked Emails, TIME (July 25, 2016), time.com/4422715/bernie-sandersdnc-apology-leaked-emails/ (declaring, “[o]n behalf of everyone at the DNC, we
want to offer a deep and sincere apology to Senator Sanders, his supporters, and
the entire Democratic party for inexcusable remarks made over email.”).
Political party national conventions occur every four years with the purposes of
nominating a candidate for the general election and establishing a party’s
platform.
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propose that the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care be imposed on
party committee members. Second, based on the similar effects
between vote dilution practices and when parties undermine their
constituents’ votes, a statute geared to deter and prevent said
behavior will also be proposed in section IV.B. In addition, section
IV.C will elaborate as to why the class action’s flaws are not present
in either of the solutions proposed therein.

II. BACKGROUND
This part begins with a historical discussion on political parties
and their rights. Specifically, it discusses when political parties
assert rights, and when courts fail to recognize the rights due to a
party’s behavior. This is critical in gauging the feasibility of the two
solutions proposed in part IV. In section II.A, an overview of
fiduciary duties imposed on corporate directors is provided so the
reader can better understand the analogies presented in section
III.A. For this same reason, a discussion on the right to vote, and
its significance, is provided in section II.B. To close, a brief overview
of a dismissed class action lawsuit, against the DNC and
Wasserman Schultz, is provided in section II.C.

A. The Evolution of Political Parties and Their Rights
Political parties have been around as long as the United States
itself.11 However, in this nation’s early years, political parties were
viewed as a threat to its very existence.12 Twelve years after the
Declaration of Independence, James Madison referred to political
parties as “mortal diseases” that cause governments to perish.13
Despite this label, he conceded that it was impossible to prevent the
formation of political parties because of people’s tendency to form
different opinions.14 However, Madison argued that a democratic
republic government could control the dangers of political parties.15
Since then, parties’ policies, beliefs, and regional bases of
support have evolved, but the two-party system has dominated the
11. Andrew Pierce, Regulating Our Mischievous Factions: Presidential
Nominations and the Law, 78 KY. L.J. 311, 315 (1990). Pierce provides a
historical analysis of American presidential nominations to set the background
for his article. Id. at 314-15.
12. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (discussing
dangers of political parties and proposing solutions to said dangers). The
Federalist Papers were a series of essays, written by Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and John Jay, promoting the ratification of the Constitution.
History.com Staff, Federalist Papers, HISTORY.COM (2009), www.history.com/to
pics/federalist-papers. These essays were anonymously published in 1787 and
1788. Id.
13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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political arena since before the Civil War.16 Ideally, these parties
are composed of “like-minded individual voters”17 with the goals of
winning elections and shaping public policy through the leaders
they elect.18
In playing such an integral role in our democratic republic19, it
should come as no surprise that political parties are afforded
constitutional rights.20 Most notably, parties enjoy the freedom of
association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.21
Over the years, courts have elaborated on what the right of
association entails.22
The right of association includes the right to determine which
messages the political parties wish to promote23, the right to
conduct internal affairs free of government interference24, and the
right to exclude.25 Inherent in the right to exclude is the
constitutional right for political parties to control their own
memberships.26 In doing so, parties may endorse candidates during
primary elections.27 The Supreme Court stated that a political
16. DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 241 (2013). Daniel P.
Tokaji is a law professor at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law
and “an authority on the law of elections and democracy.” Faculty Directory,
THE OHIO STATE UNIV., moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/professor/daniel-p-tokaji/
(last visited Apr. 14, 2017).
17. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 241 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357
(1997) (opining, “[t]he First Amendment protects the right of citizens to
associate and to form political parties for the advancement of common political
goals and ideas.”).
19. TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 241.
20. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., It’s My Party and I’ll Do What I Want To:
Political Parties, Unconstitutional Conditions, and the Freedom of Association,
12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 65, 78 (2013) (discussing cases that established
political parties’ constitutional rights).
21. Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216 (1989).
22. See Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 405 U.S. 107,
126 (1981) (holding that if political party wished to run closed primary, state
could not demand that delegates to party’s national convention be chosen
through open primary); see Eu, 489 U.S. at 224-25, 229, 230-31, 233 (holding
that states could not interfere with parties internal governance or prevent
parties’ governing bodies from endorsing candidates in primaries); see Tashjian
v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224-25 (1986) (holding that state
could not force party to hold closed primary if party wished to invite
independents to participate).
23. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224; La Follette, 450 U.S. at 123-24.
24. Eu, 489 U.S. at 229-33.
25. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000).
26. See id. at 574 (stating, “a corollary of the right to associate is the right
not to associate.”).
27. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 216 (holding that a ban on political parties’ ability to
endorse primary candidates was unconstitutional because it violated the First
Amendment because “free discussion about candidates for public office is no less
critical before a primary than before a general election”); see Abrams v. Reno,
452 F. Supp. 1166, 1167 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (striking down a state law prohibiting
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party’s right to exclude is most important during the nomination
process.28 As Justice Thurgood Marshall explained, “[b]arring
political parties from endorsing and opposing candidates . . .
infringes upon their freedom of association.”29 In recognizing these
rights, the Supreme Court has given political parties a certain
degree of autonomy.30 This autonomy develops parties’ identities
and missions31, and has been historically safeguarded by the
courts.32 However, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
recognize these associational rights when they clash with
restrictions on discrimination.33
Notwithstanding the two-parties’ durability mentioned above,
political parties have internal conflict.34 With regards to intra-party
disputes, courts have frequently refused to get involved on the
ground that such disputes are non-justiciable political questions.35
Historically, courts have viewed political parties as private
associations.36 However, some courts have labelled parties as quasigovernmental actors.37 This Comment will propose two alternative
remedies depending on how courts view political parties moving
forward. Both proposals are geared towards preventing behavior
intended to manipulate elections and promoting the integrity of our
democracy.

a state executive committee of any political party from endorsing or opposing
any candidate of its political party in any primary election as unconstitutional).
Although parties have the right to endorse a candidate, they explicitly limit this
right in their Charter. The Charter of the Democratic Party, supra note 3, at
art. V, § 4.
28. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 575.
29. Eu, 489 U.S. at 224.
30. See Pierce, supra note 11, at 319.
31. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled
Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 840-41 (2005) (stating “[a]ssociations have
an intimate connection to freedom of speech values in large part because they
are special sites for the generation of thoughts and ideas.”).
32. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 230 (striking down state restrictions limiting a
political party’s discretion in how to organize itself, conduct its affairs, and
select its leaders); see Deamer v. Jones, 42 N.J. 516, 520 (1964) (proclaiming,
“[h]istorically, courts have been most reluctant to interfere in intraparty
controversies in the absence of the violation of a controlling statute or the
infringement of a clear legal right.”).
33. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 474-77 (1953).
34. TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 242.
35. O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1972); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962) (identifying six factors to help determine what questions are
political in nature).
36. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 258 (1921).
37. See Davis v. Sullivan Cty. Democratic Comm., 375 N.E.2d 730, 730 (N.Y.
1978) (opining that political parties “are not private associations, but
associations with public and quasi-official status performing a governmental, or
at least quasi-governmental, function in the electoral process”).
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B. A Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duties38
Beginning with the view that political parties are private
associations39, a brief highlight of a corporate director’s fiduciary
duties is warranted to provide the basic knowledge necessary to
understand the analogies presented in section III.A.
“[Someone] standing in a fiduciary relation with another is
subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of
duty imposed by the relation.”40 A fiduciary duty is “[a] duty of
utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary
to the beneficiary.”41 It often arises “if a person transacts business
or manages money or property for the benefit of another.”42
Corporate directors manage the business for the benefit of the
shareholders.43 Therefore, corporate directors have been found to
owe a fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its shareholders.44
“The business and affairs of a corporation are managed by or
under the direction of its board of directors.”45 Along with these
powers is a rigid fiduciary duty to preserve the corporation’s
interests and to act in the best interests of its shareholders.46 In
addition to protecting a corporation’s interests, a director must
avoid conduct that would, in any way, injure the corporation.47
Numerous court decisions explicitly adopted the triad of fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.48 However, in 2006,
Delaware’s Supreme Court held that good faith is not an
independent fiduciary duty.49 Nonetheless, failing to act in good
faith may trigger liability because the requirement to act in good
faith is ancillary to the fundamental duty of loyalty.50 In other

38. This comment will rely heavily on Delaware case law because it is “the
most prominent corporate law jurisdiction.” Lyman Johnson, After Enron:
Remembering Loyalty Discourse In Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 35
(2003)
39. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 258.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979).
41. Fiduciary Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
42. Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities Revisited,
61 U. KAN. L. REV. 923, 925 (2013).
43. Id.
44. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (West 2016).
46. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993); Guth v.
Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del.
1984); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872; Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988).
47. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
48. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001); McMullin v.
Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000); Emerald v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221
(Del. 1999); McCrae Assocs., LLC v. Universal Capital Mgmt., Inc., 746 F. Supp.
2d 389, 399 (D. Conn. 2010).
49. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006).
50. Id.
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words, acting in good faith is a condition of the duty of loyalty.51
Traditionally, the duty of loyalty arose in situations where a
corporate director had a financial, self-dealing, conflict of interest
with the corporation and/or its shareholders.52 In addition, the duty
of loyalty applies when a corporate director acts in bad faith.53 A
common example of bad faith is when a director shows “reckless
indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the interests of the
shareholders.”54 Bad faith also includes conduct motivated by an
actual intent to do harm.55 Essentially, the duty of loyalty requires
a director to subordinate his interests not shared by shareholders
for the best interest of the corporation.56
Of equal importance to the duty of loyalty, is the duty of care.57
The duty of care concerns the decision-making process of a corporate
director.58 The key inquiry hinges on whether a director’ made a
grossly negligent decision during the decisional process.59
Due to directors’ roles within a corporation, it is no surprise
that most scenarios that generate breach of fiduciary duty
allegations involve director conduct.60 There are two things a
plaintiff must prove to prevail on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
against a corporate director.61 The director must have owed the
corporation a fiduciary duty62 and the director must have breached
that duty.63
Courts have established a doctrine known as the business
judgment rule, in order to limit court interference with a

51. Id.
52. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (opining, “directors
can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any
personal benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit
which devolves upon the corporation or all [shareholders] generally.”).
53. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70.
54. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67, n.111 (2006)
(quoting Allaun v. Consol. Oil Corp., 147 A 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929)).
55. Id. at 64.
56. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (asserting,
“[d]irectorial interest exists whenever divided loyalties are present, or a director
either has received . . . a personal benefit from the challenged transaction which
is not equally shared by the stockholders.”).
57. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993).
58. In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., S’holders Litig., 825 A.2d 240, 257 (Del. Ch.
2002).
59. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 366; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984) (adopting gross negligence standard in duty of care context); see
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874(Del. 1985) (adopting gross negligence
standard in duty of care context). Gross negligence includes “reckless
indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders.”
Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. 7861, slip op at 12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
60. See Hecker, supra note 42, at 926.
61. Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch. 2010).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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corporation’s business affairs.64 65 This rule is a “presumption that
in making a business decision[,] the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the
action was in the best interests of the company.”66 However, the rule
does not completely shield directors from liability.67
The business judgment rule may be rebutted only if the
plaintiff can make a prima facie showing that, in making the
challenged decision, the director breached the duty of loyalty or
care, and/or acted in bad faith.68 In this circumstance, directors may
be liable for breach of fiduciary duty.69

C. The Importance of a Citizen’s Right to Vote
In addition to being viewed as private associations, courts
sometimes label political parties as quasi-governmental actors.70
When parties are viewed as quasi-governmental actors, the
government is permitted to regulate them.71 Beginning in the early
64. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360; see Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988) (stating courts “should decline to evaluate the
wisdom and merits of a business decision unless sufficient facts are alleged with
particularity, or the record otherwise demonstrates, that the decision was not
the product of an informed, disinterested, and independent board”); see Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (opining that if
business decision has rational purpose, court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the board); see Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971) (stating “court will not interfere with the judgment of board of directors
unless there is showing of gross and palpable overreaching”); see A.C.
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch.
1986) (stating court will “decline to evaluate merits or wisdom of transaction
once it is shown that decision to accomplish transaction was made by directors
with no financial interest in the transaction adverse to the corporation . . .”).
65. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608-09 (Del. Ch. 1974) (pointing
out that the business judgment rule has been reaffirmed and broadened over
past several decades).
66..Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see Robinson v.
Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del. Ch. 1924) (establishing
presumption that directors are motivated “by a bona fide regard for the
interests of the corporation”); see Allaun v. Consolidated Co. 147 A. 257,
261(Del. Ch. 1929) (finding the judgment of directors is entitled to presumption
of honesty and good faith).
67. H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight
Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 13 (2001).
68. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
69. Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable
Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 927
(2006). In this article, DeMott suggests that the “determining criterion [in
deciding whether a fiduciary relationship is owed to a beneficiary] is whether
the [beneficiary] would be justified in expecting loyal conduct on the part of an
actor and whether the actor’s conduct contravened that expectation.” Id. at 936.
70. See Davis v. Sullivan Cty. Democratic Comm., 375 N.E.2d 730, 730 (N.Y.
1978)
71. See id. (declaring “internal affairs of political parties may be regulated
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twentieth century, political party regulation started to increase,
raising the question of whether parties were governed by federal
law.72 Initially, the answer was no.73 However, a string of cases
concluded that the Constitution does apply to political party
primaries. For example, the Constitution protects minorities that
are prohibited from participating in the primaries because of their
race.74 Additionally, courts will interfere if infringement of a clear
legal right exists, such as the right to vote.75
Section III.B will compare the effects of a party committee
undermining votes with the effects of the vote dilution practices
introduced therein. Prior to discussing this comparison, a
discussion on the right to vote is warranted to contextualize the
severity of this type of behavior.
“No right is more precious in a free country than that of having
a voice in [an] election . . . . Other rights, even the most basic, are
illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”76 This statement allows
the reasonable inference that if “we the people” cannot vote, our
democratic republic is nothing but a farce.77 It also highlights the
fact that casting a vote is not the same as casting a meaningful
vote.78
Surprisingly, the right to vote is not explicitly guaranteed in
the text of our Constitution.79 However, the Supreme Court first
characterized voting as a fundamental right in 1886.80 The idea is
that citizens vote with the goal of acquiring governmental
representation.81 By participating, citizens hope that, ideally, our

by the [government].”).
72. TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 246.
73. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 257-58 (1921) (concluding that
a statute limiting campaign contributions and expenditures did not apply to
U.S. Senate primary because regulation of primaries fell outside scope of federal
power).
74. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (holding a political
association’s exclusion of African Americans violated Fifteenth Amendment).
75. Batko v. Sayreville Democratic Org., 373 N.J. Super. 93, 100 (Super. Ct.
App. 2004); Pierce, supra note 11, at 342.
76. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added).
77. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (declaring that a
democratic republic is when the government is delegated “to a small number of
citizens elected by the rest”) (emphasis added).
78. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (explaining
that the right to vote may be affected by dilution and not just by denial of the
vote).
79. See Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 9 (1982) (opining
“the Constitution does not confer the right [to vote] upon anyone”) (quoting
Minor v. Hapersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874)).
80. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (proclaiming that
“[voting] is regarded as a fundamental political right, because [it is]
preservative of all rights.”).
81. TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 33-34.
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representatives ensure that all of their interests are protected.82
The primary source for a citizen’s right to vote is provided in the
Fourteenth Amendment.83 Not surprisingly, however, the
Fourteenth Amendment is not the sole constitutional amendment
protecting this right.84
Despite these constitutional protections, certain election laws
and practices have prevented certain people from voting while also
weakening certain groups of voters.85 This is commonly known as
“vote dilution.”86 The Supreme Court has held these types of laws
and practices are unconstitutional because a system that denies
“equal participation by all voters” violates the Equal Protection
Clause.87 In invalidating these types of practices, the Supreme
Court looked to promote fair political competition.88
In 1980, the Supreme Court stated that when plaintiffs
brought a vote dilution claim, they were required to show
discriminatory intent and effect.89 This ruling produced a wave of
criticism, particularly that these requirements would end vote
dilution claims.90 In response to this concern, Congress amended
section two of the Voting Rights Act, making it easier to prove vote
dilution.91 Specifically, the amendment prohibits all practices that
result in the “denial or abridgment” of the right to vote.92 The
resulting practices are determined by the totality of
circumstances.93 Essentially, after the amendment to section two, a
82. Id. at 34.
83. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(1966) (holding that right to vote is fundamental interest under Equal
Protection Clause).
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting denial or abridgment of
citizen’s right to vote on account of race); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (prohibiting
denial or abridgment of citizen’s right to vote due to sex); U.S. CONST. amend.
XXIV, § 1 (prohibiting denial or abridgment of citizen’s right to vote for failing
to pay any poll tax or other tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (prohibiting
denial or abridgment of citizen’s right to vote on account of age to citizens 18
and older).
85. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)
(holding that literacy tests were constitutional if used in race-neutral fashion);
see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (striking down city boundaries
that had been redrawn so as to prevent African Americans from voting in city
elections); see Harper, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll tax in state
elections under Equal Protections Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); See
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (striking down prohibition on voting by
those believed to lack sufficient interest).
86. TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 93.
87. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964) (declaring “each and
every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the
political process. . . ”).
88. Id.
89. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980).
90. TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 116.
91. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2016).
92. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2016).
93. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2016).

118

The John Marshall Law Review

[51:107

showing of discriminatory results, not intent, is required for a vote
dilution claim.94
The information above is necessary for two reasons. First, it
provides the reader with a general history and understanding of the
significance of a citizen’s right to vote. Building off the general
history, the comparisons presented in section III.B give weight and
provide guidance to the solution ultimately proposed in section IV.

D. Wilding v. DNC Services Corp.
The DNC’s behavior during the primaries upset many voters.
Some of these voters sought to rectify their alleged injustice by filing
a class action lawsuit in July 2016 against the DNC and Wasserman
Schultz in the Southern District of Florida.95 The complaint
proposed three classes consisting of: (1) anyone who donated to the
DNC since the start of 2015, (2) anyone who donated to Sanders’
campaign since 2015, and (3) all registered voters of the Democratic
Party.96 The complaint alleged six counts against the defendants,
including breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.97 At the core of the
plaintiffs’ allegations was the defendants’ failure to remain
impartial throughout the presidential primary process.98 The
plaintiffs prayed for, amongst other things, compensatory damages,
“declaratory and injunctive relief declaring illegal and enjoining . .
. defendant’s violation and failure to follow the Charter and Bylaws
of the Democratic Party,” as well as punitive damages “in an
amount sufficient to deter and to make an example of defendants.”99
In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of standing pursuant to Article 3 of the Constitution and the
complaint’s failure to meet pleading requirements set forth by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.100 Defendants’ standing argument
began with the contention that the plaintiffs failed to allege a
“cognizable injury-in fact.”101 Specifically, defendants argued that
merely donating money to the DNC did not give plaintiffs an

94. TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 118.
95. First Amended Complaint, Wilding v. DNC Services Corp., No. 0-16-cv61511-WJZ (11th Cir. July 13, 2016), ECF No. 8 [hereinafter Wilding
Complaint].
96. Wilding Complaint, supra note 95, at 29.
97. Wilding Complaint, supra note 95, at 31-32, 35.
98. Wilding Complaint, supra note 95, at 21-28.
99. Wilding Complaint, supra note 95, at 38.
100. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
and Memorandum of Law in Support, Wilding v. DNC Services Corp., No. 0-16cv-61511-WJZ (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 2016), ECF No. 44 [hereinafter DNC Motion
to Dismiss]. Defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ complaint fails to meet the
basic pleading requirements set forth in rules 8,9, and 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
101. DNC Motion to Dismiss, supra note 100, at 5.
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interest in the DNC’s operations.102 Additionally, the defendants
contended that “any bias” by defendants could not be found to
“diminish plaintiffs’ influence as voters.”103 The defendants also
stated that there was no causal link between the plaintiffs’ alleged
injuries and the defendants’ alleged actions.104 Moreover,
defendants stated that the injuries were not redressable and an
attempt by the court to give the requested relief would infringe on
the defendants’ rights of association.105 Ultimately, the court
dismissed the lawsuit due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing.106 Some
flaws of this class-action are discussed in section III.C.

III. ANALYSIS
This section begins by highlighting the key similarities
between a corporate director’s duties and the duties of a political
party’s committee members. The section then explains the similar
effects of a party undermining certain voters to trigger classic vote
dilution tactics, elaborated herein. Lastly, this section discusses the
flaws of Wilding, leading to the two solutions proposed in part IV.

A. Party Committee Members Parallel Corporate
Directors
Fiduciary duties arise if “a person(s) transacts business or
manages money or property . . . for the benefit of another.”107 The
national committees of political parties transact business on behalf
of their voters by coordinating and assisting in elections.108 They
also manage their voters’ money by fundraising during elections.109
The fiduciary duties of loyalty and care are founded on the
reality that corporate directors are obligated to the actual owners of
corporations, the shareholders.110 Similarly, one could argue that
political party committee members are obligated to the actual
“owners” of our country, the people.111 This idea is not novel, but an
102. Id.
103. DNC Motion to Dismiss, supra note 100, at 7.
104. DNC Motion to Dismiss, supra note 100, at 8-9.
105. DNC Motion to Dismiss, supra note 100, at 9-10.
106. David Weigel, Florida Judge Dismisses Fraud Lawsuit Against DNC,
THE WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/w
p/2017/08/25/florida-judge-dismisses-fraud-lawsuit-against-dnc/?utm_term=.3
0dc15f4b660.
107. Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities Revisited,
61 U. KAN. L. REV. 923, 925 (2013).
108. The Charter of the Democratic Party, supra note 3, at art. I, §§ 1, 3.
109. The Charter of the Democratic Party, supra note 3, at art. I, § 5.
110. 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, BLAKE ROHRBACHER,
CONTRIBUTOR, DUTY OF LOYALTY § 4.16 (3d ed. 2016).
111. See U.S. Const. pmbl. (reading “[w]e the People . . . do ordain and
establish . . . .”).
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extension of ones proposed in the past.112 Moreover, constitutional
history and political theory support the view that politicians stand
in fiduciary relationships with those they represent.113 For example,
John Locke argued that government must act on behalf of the
citizens and not in its own interest.114 This is similar to the fiduciary
duty of loyalty found in the corporate context.115 It has also been
argued that the Constitution is appropriately understood as a
corporate charter delegating power to agents and specifying rules of
governance.116 This perspective is based on a contractual theory of
government, with the terms of the contract involving the
appointment of power from the people to the government.117
Assuming government officials owe fiduciary duties to those
they represent, those in charge of running the process in which
these officials are elected too should undoubtedly owe the same
duties. If political parties owe fiduciary duties to their voters, a
breach of these duties would presumably arise when a party
committee’s actions, damage the party’s general interests as well as
when a party fails to act in its voters’ best interests.118 More in
112. See generally D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 671 (2013) (discussing constitutional history and political theories that
support view that politicians should owe fiduciary duties). Rave suggests that
to control incumbent self-dealing in redistricting, political representatives
should be treated as fiduciaries. Id. at 677. While acknowledging that the
Framers designed the Constitution to impose fiduciary duties on government
officials, Rave states that “scholarship has largely ignored the area of law where
the fiduciary model would . . . have its most natural application—the field of
election law.” Id. at 677-78. The issues surrounding the 2016 presidential
primaries provide more incentive for the courts to agree with Rave, as well as
with the proposal presented in IV.A of this comment.
113. Id. at 679.
114. See Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52
BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1117 (2004) (stating, “[a]ccording to Locke, public officials
should not engage in self-dealing . . .”).
115. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (declaring, “the rule
that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands
that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest”).
116. Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). Miller provides legitimate
reasons to support the assertion that “[t]he Constitution . . . is a corporate
charter.” Id. For instance, “[the Constitution] sets forth powers of the institution
and establishes limits on the exercise of those powers.” Id. Miller goes on to
analogize these functions with those found in corporate charters in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Id. at 4; see Eric Enlow, The Corporate
Conception of the State and the Origins of Limited Constitutional Government,
6 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 1, 16 (2001) (quoting jurist Francis Lieber, “[a]ll the
American governments are corporations created by charters, viz. their
constitutions . . .”).
117. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1121-22 (1998) (proclaiming that the “Constitution was
designed and approved like a contract” and part of a contract is surrendering
power to representatives).
118. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Pogostin
v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
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depth analyses of the duties of loyalty and care are found in the two
ensuing sections.
1. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty includes situations where “the fiduciary
fails to act in good faith.”119 This can occur “where the fiduciary
intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the
best interests of the corporation . . . or where the fiduciary
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.”120 If a director
breaches her duty of loyalty, she may be liable for monetary
damages.121
An example of a self-interested director can be found in
Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch.
2000).122 This case concerned a merger plan allegedly structured to
maximize a director’s personal benefit at the expense of the
shareholders through “side-deals.”123 The allegations in the
complaint suggested the directors breached their duties of loyalty,
and although two directors did not receive personal benefits, they
acquiesced in the self-interested negotiations and approved the
merger at an unfair price.124 The court stated this revealed the
directors failed to place the corporation’s interests above their own,
evincing a clear lack of concern for their duty of loyalty.125

Similarly, the presidential primaries are in a sense “business
transactions.”126 Political parties can be equated to corporations127,
1984).
119. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
120. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (2006)
121. See 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) (stating provisions in certificate of corporation
may eliminate director’s personal liability for monetary damages but shall not
eliminate liability for a director’s breach of duty of loyalty to shareholders or
corporation).
122. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2000).
123. Id. at 970. These “side-deals” gave the director, amongst other things,
a substantial equity interest in the surviving entity, tax advantages not offered
to other shareholders, and a position on the surviving entity’s board of directors.
Id.
124. Id. at 982.
125. Id. at 981.
126. See The Charter of the Democratic Party, supra note 3, at art. I, § 1
(stating party will assist in elections); see id., supra note 3, at art. I, § 5 (stating
party will handle money for “successful operation” of party).
127. See Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th pocket ed. 2011)
(defining corporation as “[a]n entity having authority under law to act as a
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with the constituents holding similar roles to shareholders, and
their votes being the “shares.”128 Using the DNC email leak as an
example, many have argued that the committee members’ actions
eroded the fairness of the 2016 primary.129 For example, by backing
one candidate a party directly undermines the campaign of
another.130 Therefore, by failing to advance the best interests of the
entire party and all of the voters, the committee members involved
should be found to have breached the duty of loyalty.131
In addition to self-interest, directors breach the duty of loyalty
when they show a conscious disregard for a known duty to act.132
“Only if [directors] knowingly and completely failed to undertake
their responsibilities would they breach their duty of loyalty.”133 For
instance, a court refused to find a breach of the duty of loyalty in a
case where corporate directors: (1) were aware of their company’s
value, (2) listened to their financial and legal advisors, (3) tried to
get a better offer, and (4) approved the merger because it was “too
good not to pass along [to the stockholders] for their
consideration.”134 In this case, the directors had a duty to strive to
secure the best sale price.135 The court noted the immense
distinction between an insufficient attempt to perform fiduciary
duties and a conscious disregard for those duties, in reaching its
decision.136 Unlike the directors in Lyondell, the DNC showed a
conscious disregard, as evinced by the leaked emails, for their duty
to remain impartial and evenhanded.137

single person distinct from the shareholders who own it . . .”).
128. See Shareholder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th pocket ed. 2011)
(defining shareholder as “[o]ne who owns or holds a share in a company, esp. a
corporation).
129. See H.A. Goodman, Wikileaks Emails Show DNC Favored Hillary
Clinton Over Bernie Sanders During The Democratic Primary, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 23, 2016 2:39 AM), www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/wikileaks-emails
-show-dnc-favored-hillary-clinton-over_us_57930be0e4b0e002a3134b05
(proclaiming if emails are legitimate then “we know Bernie Sanders was never
given a fair and equal opportunity to win the nomination.”). But see Allen
Clifton, For the Last Time: Here’s Proof the Democratic Primary Wasn’t Rigged
Against Bernie Sanders, FORWARD PROGRESSIVES (July 25, 2016),
www.forwardprogressives.com/for-the-last-time-heres-proof-the-democratic-pri
mary-wasnt-rigged-against-bernie-sanders/ (arguing “only 6 or 7 emails . . .
were deemed to be remotely ‘anti-Bernie.’”).
130. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
131. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986) (finding directors breached duty of loyalty when entering into
agreement “at the expense of the shareholders”).
132..In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (2006).
133. Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243-44 (Del. 2009).
134. Id. at 244.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 243.
137. The Charter of the Democratic, supra note 3, at art. V, § 4.
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2. Duty of Care
Corporate directors must exercise due care in the decisionmaking process. Gross negligence must be proven to demonstrate a
breach of due care.138 Deciding if directors have exercised due care
when making a decision demands a consideration of whether the
directors educated themselves “of all material information
reasonably available to them.”139 Because corporate directors are
duty bound to preserve the corporation’s and its shareholder’s
economic interests, they must evaluate information with a “critical
eye.”140
A classic example of directors breaching their duties of care is
found in Smith v. Van Gorkom.141 Here, a corporation’s CEO chose
to pursue a merger, and without informing anybody, proposed an
amount per share which reciprocated with a time-constrained
offer.142 One day before the “deadline,” the board of directors met
and were informed of the proposal.143 However, the CEO failed to
inform the board on the reasons or basis of the proposed price per
share.144 Delaware courts have stated that acting in a hurry calls
for problems.145 Nonetheless, the meeting lasted two hours and the
merger agreement was approved.146 The court stated the directors
were, “at a minimum grossly negligent.”147
Like corporate directors, political parties’ committees must
make decisions for the benefit of the party, and all of its members,
through their respective platforms.148 Although these decisions are
not the same as those commonly made by directors, i.e., agreeing to
138. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (discussing “conduct
giving rise to a violation of duty of care (i.e., gross negligence)”).
139. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
140. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
141. Id. at 881 (Del. 1985).
142. Id. at 866-67.
143. Id. at 867.
144. Id. at 868.
145. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 922 (Del. 2000) (stating “[t]he
imposition of time constraints on a board’s decision-making process may
compromise the integrity of its deliberative process. History has demonstrated
boards ‘that have failed to exercise due care are frequently boards that have
been rushed.’”) (quoting Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569
A.2d 53, 67 (Del. 1989)).
146. Smith, 488 A.2d at 869.
147. Id. at 874.
148. See Republican Platform 2016, pmbl., prod-cdn-static. gop.com/media/d
ocuments/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf [hereinafter Republican
Platform] (stating “[w]ith this platform, we the Republican party reaffirm the
principles that unite us in a common purpose”); see also 2016 Democratic Party
Platform, pmbl. (July 21, 2016), www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/07/Democratic-Party-Platform-7.21.16-no-lines.pdf
[hereinafter
Democratic Platform] (stating “Democrats meet . . . with the same basic belief
that animated the Continental Congress when they gathered here 240 years
ago: Out of many, we are one.”).
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a merger agreement, they are for the benefit of the party –
ultimately to appeal to voters for support by highlighting policy
ideologies that the public is passionate about.149 Committees create
themselves and purport to represent the entire party while
remaining impartial.150 This creates a duty of care.151 As such,
committee members should consider the entire party, and make
decisions that do not disregard any voters.152

B. Comparing Vote Dilution to When a Party
Committee Undermines Votes
This section will compare the effects of classic vote dilution to
the effects of a party undermining certain votes to support the
ultimate conclusion that this behavior needs to be prevented in a
similar fashion. The Constitution restricts party primaries when
citizens are excluded from the primaries on account of their race.153
Besides race-based exclusions, however, parties’ actions have rarely
been found to be unconstitutional.154 This Comment is not
concerned with vote denial, but rather, situations in which a party
committee’s actions undermine, or “dilute,” its constituents’ voting
rights.
Traditionally, vote dilution occurs when state governments or
their political subdivisions enact an election law or practice
weakening the votes of minority group members, which deceases
the groups’ opportunities for meaningful participation in said
election.155 Vote dilution can occur in numerous scenarios including,
but not limited to, malapportionment, at-large elections and
gerrymandering, detailed below.156

149. See Republican Platform, supra note 146, at pmbl. (highlighting
economic policies, including “rebuilding the economy”); see also Democratic
Platform, supra note 146, at pmbl. (stating party will work on “raising workers’
wages,” and focus on social policies such as “bringing Americans together” and
“defend[ing] religious beliefs”).
150. The Charter of the Democratic Party, supra note 3, at art. V, § 4.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., id. at art. I, § 4 (declaring the Democratic Party “shall
establish standard and rules of procedure that afford all members of the
Democratic Party full, timely and equal opportunities to participate in decisions
concerning the selection of candidates . . . and the conduct of other Party affairs
. . .”).
153. TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 250.
154. Id.
155. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 370 (1963) (challenging the
constitutionality of a state statute); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964)
(suing various state and political party officials in their representative
capacity); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 340 (1960) (challenging the validity
of a local act passed by state legislature).
156. 29 C.J.S. Elections § 27 (2016) (emphasis added).
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1. Malapportionment
Malapportionment occurs when voting districts with varying
amounts of citizens have identical government representation.157
Preventing malapportionment rests on the idea first expressed in
Gray v. Sanders, that the “conception of political equality . . . can
mean only one thing – one person, one vote.”158 In Gray, a Georgia
voter challenged a “county unit” system for counting votes in
primaries where candidates for statewide office competed on a
county-by-county basis.159 This was troublesome because the
candidate who won most of the counties would win the election,
regardless of whether that candidate received less total statewide
votes.160 The Court held that this “county unit” system violated the
Equal Protection Clause.161
The Supreme Court went on to use the idea of “one person, one
vote” in a string of subsequent cases to strike down other state
election practices.162 For instance, in Reynolds, there were large
population disparities in the Alabama state house and state senate,
giving citizens in underpopulated areas greater government
representation than those in more populous areas.163 The Supreme
Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
opportunity for equal participation by all voters in elections.164
Therefore, Alabama’s malapportionment of state legislative bodies
violated the Equal Protection Clause.165 Chief Justice Warren
focused on the principle of “fair and effective representation” for all
citizens in elections.166 It is fairly easy to quantify the way
malapportionment weakens some citizens’ influence in
government.167 Gerrymandering and the dilution of a minority
group’s voting strength is more difficult.168

157. TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 45. Malapportionment effectively causes
people in large districts, usually those in urban areas, to be underrepresented.
Id.
158. Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
159. Id. at 370.
160. Id. at 371.
161. Id. at 379-80.
162. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (ruling that
malapportionment of congressional districts within a state violated the
Constitution); see Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 (holding that malapportionment of
state legislative bodies violated the Equal Protection Clause); see Lucas v. 44th
Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (striking down Colorado’s
malapportioned state senate districts).
163. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 545-47 (highlighting population discrepancy
of up to about 41-to-1 in Senate and up to about 16-to-1 in House).
164. Id. at 566.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 565-66.
167. TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 69.
168. Id.
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2. Gerrymandering and At-large Elections
Gerrymandering refers to the practice of drawing electoral
districts or other boundaries with the intent to give an advantage
to one group of voters while disadvantaging another, typically on
account of party affiliation or race.169 For example, in 1957,
Alabama’s legislature transformed the shape of the city of Tuskegee
from a square to a twenty-eight sided figure.170 The plaintiffs
alleged that the boundaries were redrawn with the intent to deny
them their right to vote.171 The evidence indicated that the new city
boundaries removed all but four or five of its 400 African American
voters, while simultaneously failing to remove any of its white
voters.172 The Court stated that if proven, these allegations would
establish a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on
racial discrimination in voting.173
In addition to gerrymandering, other practices were used to
diminish the strength of minorities’ votes, such as at-large
elections.174 At-large elections occur when representatives are
elected from the entire political unit rather than from particular
districts.175 Due to the high degree of prejudice at the time,
legislatures employed these methods to inevitably deny minorities
representation because the majority would effectively be able to
drown out the minorities’ votes.176
To counter these types of practices, Congress enacted the
Voting Rights Act.177 This Act prohibits all voting practices
resulting in the “denial or abridgement” of the right to vote on
account of race.178 Today, in order to bring a vote dilution claim
under the Voting Rights Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate three
preconditions.179
First, the affected minority group must be able to demonstrate that
it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in single-member district . . . Second, [the affected minority
group] must be able to show that it is politically cohesive . . . Third,
the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority
169. Id. at 77.
170. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 340 (1960)
171. Id.
172. Id. at 341.
173. Id. at 341, 346-47.
174. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548-549 (1969)
(questioning the validity of a statute that amended a district voting system to
an at-large voting system).
175. Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, “At large” elections as violation of § 2 of
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 92 A.L.R. FED. 824 n.1 (1989).
176. TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 96.
177. Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301-10314, 10501-10508, 10701,
10702 (2016).
178. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2016).
179. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986) (articulating three
“preconditions” that must be satisfied in a vote dilution case).
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votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . to defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate.180

A court must decide based on the totality of the circumstances,
whether a violation has occurred, once these preconditions are
satisfied.181
If a general principle arises out of the practices and the
government’s response to said practices above, it is that each
person’s vote is worth as much as that of others, regardless of
ethnicity, race, or political affiliation.182 With that being said, it is
clear that the preconditions to state a traditional vote dilution claim
present problems when a party committee undermines its own
constituents’ votes.183 Nevertheless, the effects of such behavior
mirrors the effects discussed above and cannot be ignored.
Voters have an expectation that elections are fair and
unimpeded from outside influences, especially from their own
political party.184 For example, secretly promoting stories to the
media or highlighting specific facts about a certain candidate with
the implicit intent of dissuading voters from electing said candidate
is not a party’s responsibility.185 These types of actions cause the
opposed candidates to lose potential votes, votes that – in addition
with votes already received – may have won them the nomination.
Simply put, it is a voter’s own actions coupled with the
supplemented political processes and the media should provide
voters with the facts and opinions necessary in deciding who to
elect. It should not be the behind-the-scenes actions of selfinterested politicians.186 In addition, the fact that a party places a
180. Id. at 50-51. These preconditions are known as “compactness,” “political
cohesiveness,” and “majority bloc voting,” respectively. TOKAJI, supra note 16,
at 123.
181. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011-12 (1994) (holding that
satisfaction of three preconditions was necessary to prevail on vote dilution
claim, but not sufficient; stating ultimate inquiry is whether, based on totality
of circumstances, minorities have no ability to effectively participate in political
process and elect representatives of choice).
182. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
183. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50 (finding minority group must
demonstrate three preconditions) (emphasis added).
184. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (declaring “the right to
elect [representatives] in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our
political system”); see The Charter of the Democratic Party, supra note 3, at art.
IX, § 8 (“Assur[ing] that the Democratic nominee for the office of President of
the United States is selected by a fair and equitable process . . .”).
185. See Leaked E-mail, DNC Email Database, WIKILEAKS (July 27, 2016),
wikileaks.org/dnc-emails/emailid/7643 (highlighting certain fact about Senator
Sanders and stating, “[t]his could make several points difference with my peeps
. . .”).
186. See Thomas M. Holbrook, Political Learning From Presidential
Debates, 21 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, 67, 67 (1999) (finding “campaigns influence
public opinion”); Gerber, Alan S., Dean Karlan, and Daniel Bergan, Does the
Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on
Voting Behavior and Political Opinions, AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL:
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restriction against its own committee members from favoring one
candidate over another in a presidential primary allows the
inference that the possible consequences of behavior are the type
committee members wish to avoid (i.e., impropriety, collusion, and
corruption) because these actions chip away at the integrity still
present in politics.187 The idea that voters expect fair and
unimpeded elections is given additional weight by the fact the
pending class action against the DNC and Wasserman Schultz was
filed by members of the Democratic party. However, for the reasons
immediately discussed below, this is not the best solution to this
problem.

C. Issues in Wilding
The court granted the DNC’s motion to dismiss due to the
plaintiff’s lack of standing.188 Aside from this obvious issue, the
length of time it took to get a ruling on the motion, as well as the
uncertainty as to whether the defendants will be reprimanded for
their wrongful behavior, are obvious flaws of the class action
approach.189 Moreover, the lawsuit failed to deter current members
of both party’s committees from behaving in a similar fashion.190
As pointed out in the defendants’ motion to dismiss, there are
clear deficiencies with the plaintiffs’ complaint.191 For instance, a
lack of “standing” is cause for immediate dismissal, with which the
court ultimately agreed.192 Even assuming the court found
standing, the complaint would likely still be dismissed due to its
failure to adequately state claims for which relief could be
granted.193 Since the motion to dismiss was granted, the plaintiffs
will receive no justice for their injuries. More importantly, the

APPLIED ECONOMICS 1(2): 35, 35 (2009) (asserting “citizens learn about politics
and government from the [media]”).
187. See The Charter of the Democratic Party, supra note 3, at pmbl. (stating
“we pledge ourselves to open, honest endeavor and to the conduct of public
affairs in a manner worthy of a society of free people.”).
188. David Weigel, Florida Judge Dismisses Fraud Lawsuit Against DNC,
THE WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
wp/2017/08/25/florida-judge-dismisses-fraud-lawsuit-against-dnc/?utm_term=.
30dc15f4b660.
189. See Wilding Complaint, supra note 95, at 39 (showing complaint filed
on July 13, 2016).
190. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
191. DNC Motion to Dismiss, supra note 100, at 4-12.
192. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (holding that to establish standing the
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) he has suffered “a concrete and particularized”
injury, (2) that is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party [who is]
not before the court,” and (3) “likely . . . will be redressed by a favorable [judicial]
decision”).
193. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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defendants, unfortunately, will walk away scot free. Thus providing
no deterrence for politicians similar behavior in the future. Neither
of the solutions proposed in part IV will face issues like those that
were present in the class action complaint.194
Evidenced by the motion to dismiss being granted, the two
proposals introduced below nevertheless are better solutions to the
problem at the heart of this Comment. The class action, even though
it was unsuccessful, in no way deters future similar behavior by
members of party committees. The plaintiffs were seeking both
compensatory and punitive damages.195 However, money is not an
issue for the deep pockets of political parties. Compensating the
plaintiffs for their campaign donations, as well as paying punitive
damages, very well may be a price parties are willing to pay if it
means their preferred candidate is elevated to the General Election.
Further, identifying who was injured and quantifying the value of
the specific injuries for purposes of damages seems difficult, if not
impossible. To solve these issues, a big picture, long term approach
is needed. Hence, the proposals introduced and explained below.

IV. PROPOSAL
If there is a silver lining to the 2016 election season, it is the
fact that citizens have now been made aware of the lack of integrity
in the U.S. political arena. The DNC email leak brought to light
what many citizens believed for some time - that at times, outside
influences erode the fairness of elections.196 This corruption must be
eliminated. This section provides two alternative remedies
depending on how courts label political parties moving forward. If
the judiciary believes a political party to be a private association,
fiduciary duties from the corporate context provide guidance on how
to rectify a breach of those duties. On the other hand, if the courts
believe political parties to be quasi-governmental actors, historic
vote dilution claims provide the insight on how to deal with a party
affecting the integrity of elections by undermining certain votes.

A. The Fiduciary Duties of a Committee Member
If political party committees are deemed to be private
associations, the law should impose the same duties of loyalty and
care on committee members that are imposed on corporate
directors. As shown in section III.A, national committee members
hold positions in their respective parties with similar
194. See discussion infra part IV.
195. Wilding Complaint, supra note 95, at 38.
196. See 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, GALLUP
WORLD POLL (Sept. 19, 2015), www.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-gover
nment-corruption.aspx (finding “the percentage of U.S. adults who see
corruption as pervasive has never been less than a majority in the past decade”).
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responsibilities and duties to those of a corporate director.197
Committee members are given power over the interests of voters,
i.e., fair elections and policy ideologies expressed in party platforms.
This relationship exposes voters to potential abuse by the
committee members,198 as evinced by the DNC email leak.
Therefore, the law should impose on party committee members the
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care so that they act in the interest
of the entire party. The imposition of these duties would protect
voters from abuse at the hands of their own party.199 Further,
imposing these duties will discourage committee members from
acting in ways that may leave them open to liability, ultimately,
contributing to the goal of promoting integrity in politics.
In the business of politics, situations will undoubtedly arise
where the duty of loyalty is at issue. A fiduciary breaches his duty
of loyalty when he fails to advance the best interest(s) of the
corporation or fails to act in good faith.200 Both political parties and
voters have an interest in fair and unimpeded elections.201
Therefore, party committee members should always put the voters’
interests ahead of their own underlying interests.202 If they are
found to breach this duty by failing to do so, they will be liable for
monetary damages. These damages will be deposited into an
account used to help fund annual investigations, by a neutral thirdparty, into the specific party committee’s actions. These
investigations are geared towards promoting political party
transparency.
Assuming committee members breach these duties, the
available remedy is the shareholder derivative action, commonly
used in the corporate context. “A derivative suit involves a
shareholder of the corporation, acting nominally on behalf of that
corporation, generally suing the directors . . . for
mismanagement.”203 In a derivative suit, the corporation is suing
itself.204 Thus, in situations where a committee member’s actions
damage the reputation of the entire party, a voter would sue a
committee member on behalf of that party. Damages will be decided
on a case-by-case basis, depending on several factors. Those include,
but are not limited to, the severity of the behavior at issue.
197. See discussion supra Section III.A (highlighting the similarities
between the roles of corporate directors and party committee members).
198. See Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Duties and Fiduciary Outs, 21 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 157, 159 (2013) (stating those in fiduciary relationships are
vulnerable to abuse).
199. Id.
200. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (2006).
201. See authority cited supra note 183.
202. See supra text accompanying note 52.
203. John D. Hughes, Gregory D. Pendleton, Jonathan Toren, Shareholder
Derivative Litigation A Primer for Insurance Coverage Counsel and Other
Lawyers, Too, 42 BRIEF 18, 19 (2013).
204. Id. at 20.
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To provide committee members some protection, they will be
afforded a defense analogous to the business judgment rule. “The
business judgment rule shields directors from personal liability if,
upon review, the court concludes the directors’ decision can be
attributed to any rational business purpose.”205 Committee
members will be presumed to have acted in “good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
[party].”206 This rule will prevent courts from “imposing
unreasonably on the business and affairs of a [political party].”207 In
practice, if committee members make an honest mistake of
judgment, they will not be personally liable.208 This rule will place
the burden of demonstrating bad faith on the voters challenging
said action.209 To rebut this rule, the voters must establish evidence
that the committee member breached the duty of loyalty or care.210

B. A Reformulated Vote Dilution Claim
On the other hand, if parties are viewed as quasi-governmental
actors, state legislatures should implement a uniform statute
banning all behavior by political parties, through their committee
members, that is done with the intention of manipulating an
election. The effects of a party breaking its own rules are different
than the effects vote dilution tactics once had on the right to vote.211
Notwithstanding this difference, these effects are dangerous and
demand immediate attention. The right to vote is arguably a
citizen’s most important right, and when intentional behavior
infringes on it in any way, that behavior must be prevented.212
To succeed in bringing a claim under this statute, plaintiffs
must provide clear and convincing evidence that the political party
committee and/or specific committee member was purposefully or
knowingly attempting to undermine certain votes and/or influence
the election to benefit one candidate at the expense of another.213
205. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del. 1984).
206. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (opining “the
presumption initially attaches to a director-approved transaction . . . in the
absence of any evidence of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing . . .”).
207. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
208. Unitrin, Inc., 651 A.2d at 1374.
209. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1074 (Del. Ch. 1985).
210. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
211. See discussion supra Section III.B (highlighting the differences
between a party breaking its own rules and vote dilution tactics, such as the
actors involved and the ability to quantify effects).
212. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (proclaiming no right
is more “precious” than the right to vote).
213. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a), General Requirements of
Culpability (2016) (declaring a person acts purposely when “it is his conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature”); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b),

132

The John Marshall Law Review

[51:107

Empty accusations and allegations with no corroborating evidence
will be cause for dismissal. Further, proving the required state of
mind is necessary for a successful claim. A party’s behavior will not
be found to violate this statute if it is reckless or negligent.214
However, if the evidence provided is sufficient to allow a
reasonable observer to conclude that the party had such intent, the
claim will succeed. There need not be proof of any actual effects on
the result of a primary election for two reasons. First, the
appearance of impropriety is sufficient because it would be all but
impossible to quantify these effects.215 Second, the overall purpose
of the statute is to dissuade a party’s committee members from
acting this way. Thus, allowing a committee member to hide behind
the defense that ultimately “nothing happened,” as they did in the
class action, essentially takes the teeth out of this proposed statute.
If a party is found to violate the statute, the person(s)
responsible will be required to step down from their position, and
face up to a two-year ban from serving in said party’s committee.
These consequences are justified in order to deter others from
engaging in similar behavior as well as to dissuade the same
committee member from behaving similarly in the future.216
Undoubtedly, political parties will argue that the statute is
unconstitutional by infringing on their right of association.
However, this statute most likely will pass even the strictest
judicial scrutiny, known as strict scrutiny.217 Although the right of
association is a fundamental right, governments have a compelling
interest to guarantee that all votes are given the same weight and
General Requirements of Culpability (2016) (declaring a person acts knowingly
when “he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist”).
214. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), General Requirements of
Culpability (2016) (stating a person acts recklessly when he “consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk”); see MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(2)(d), General Requirements of Culpability (2016) (stating a person acts
negligently “when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk”).
215. See TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 69 (stating outside of malapportionment
it is difficult to quantify ways that votes may be diluted).
216. See Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 437, 439 (2005) (finding “there are many conceivable ends, or aims, of
punishment” including deterrence).
217. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, n. 4 (1938) (opining
“there may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments . . .”);
see Adam Winkler, Fatal In Theory and Strict In Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny In the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 868 (2006)
(stating “Supreme Court has suggested that laws burdening . . . freedom of
association are capable of overcoming strict scrutiny”). But see id. (finding
“courts consistently ruled against laws that restricted the associational rights
of political parties”). But see, e.g., Arizona Libertarian Party v. Bayless, 351 F.3d
1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2003) (invalidating state law imposing a semi-closed
primary on parties).
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that elections are fair.218 Further, it is narrowly tailored by only
banning behavior that is done knowingly and with a purpose.

C. The Above Proposals’ Advantages Over Wilding
The imposition of fiduciary duties on committee members may
take some time to generate the ideal deterrent effect, most likely
one successful derivative action. However, once a party committee
is found guilty for breach of fiduciary duty and consequently
ordered to pay into the investigatory fund, committee members will
clearly understand what is acceptable and what is not. Once this
initial suit transpires, committee members will be on notice and
deterred from behaving in a similar fashion to that of the DNC in
the 2016 presidential primaries. This deterrence is ideal because
the unavoidable length of time inherent in litigation will be
completely avoided. Additionally, with the big picture in mind,
depositing the damages into the investigatory fund promotes
political transparency in a way the class action is unable to do.
Similarly, the proposed state statute is better than a class
action because the statute’s punishments are geared towards the
individuals responsible. For instance, instead of being ordered to
pay monetary damages, the responsible party will be forced to step
down from their position and will become banned for a specific
amount of time. Avoiding all the problems associated with damages,
i.e. the inability to quantify, and the fact that a party may be willing
to pay those damages if it means their candidate moves forward, is
also better than the relief requested in the class action lawsuit. The
dismissed class action does not have the same deterrent effect as
the statute. It allows defendants to continue this behavior while the
litigation is pending. By the time any verdict comes down, if at all,
the guilty party will be indifferent to the results.
These proposed solutions are focused on deterring future
behavior similar to that of the DNC’s during the 2016 presidential
primaries as a result of the difficulty courts have in rectifying
“damages” once they have transpired. As acknowledged, these
solutions will take time to initially gain traction. However, once
they do, they will deter the sort of behavior that is Comment is
centered around.

V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of one’s views on the 2016 election season, it cannot
be denied that sensitive, yet important issues were, and still are,

218. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An
Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV.
917, 939 (1988) (stating the obligation of equality might serve as the
justification for a compelling governmental interest).
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being brought to citizens’ attention. Particularly, citizens are very
aware of the lack of integrity in our elections. Most recently, for
example, Commenters have accused Russia of attempting to
influence the outcome of the presidential election between
President Donald Trump and Secretary Hillary Clinton. This
Comment does not deal with situations similar to the Russian
hacks. It does, however, aim to deal with situations where fellow
Americans in positions of power attempt to erode the integrity of
America’s political system.
Courts have made clear that individuals possess no
fundamental right to run for office or to be a party’s candidate in an
election.219 Moreover, an individual as a result essentially has no
right to express his beliefs as the presidential candidate for a
political party220 or to associate with an “unwilling partner.”221 In
no way do the individual rights of a candidate running for office
outweigh the rights of political parties.222 Therefore, anyone that
finds themselves in a situation similar to Senator Sanders during
the 2016 Democratic primaries may be out of luck due to courts’
historical reluctance to interfere in intra-party controversies.223
However, courts should interfere when a party undermines the
United States democracy and infringes on its constituents’ rights to
vote.
All voters, regardless of political affiliation or view, want to
eliminate instances similar to the one brought to light by the DNC
email leak. Voters want to feel like their vote is as important as
their neighbors. In addition, courts recognize the importance of the
right to vote as evidenced by the measures taken, highlighted in
sections II and III, to protect it. Nonetheless, we still have behavior
affecting that right and inherently, our entire political system. This
allows many to question the legitimacy of our democracy. Hence,
the proposals introduced in section IV, above.
This Comment attempts to emphasize the fact that our
political system needs refurbishing. The proposed solutions in this
Comment may not suffice, but those in positions of power, like the
heads of political party national committees, must be held
accountable for actions that erode the integrity present in our
political system. If we want to see real change and accountability,
it is no longer enough to allow those responsible to step-down from
these positions unscathed. The powerful, for once, need to face real
consequences, for accountability breeds not only responsibility but
most importantly authenticity within our political processes.
219. Batko v. Sayreville Democratic Org., 373 N.J.Super. 93, 95 (Super. Ct.
App. 2004) (opining, “[t]here is no fundamental right to run for office or to be a
party’s candidate for an election.”).
220. Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 1996).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1232-33.
223. O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1972).
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